The Economic Impacts of the Tobacco Settlement by David M. Cutler et al.










David M. Cutler, 
Jonathan Gruber, 
Raymond S. Hartman, 
Mary Beth Landrum, 
Joseph P. Newhouse, 
and 





















  We gratefully acknowledge the comments and assistance of our colleagues Arnold Epstein, 
Richard Frank, and Charles King III, as well as James McGuire and Thomas Sobol.  We also 
acknowledge the research assistance of Jessica Walker.   Finally, we are grateful to three 
anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on our manuscript.   
 




  Recent litigation against major tobacco companies culminated in a “Master Settlement 
Agreement” (MSA) under which the participating companies agreed to compensate most states 
for Medicaid expenses. We outline the terms of the settlement and analyze whether it was a move 
toward economic efficiency using data from Massachusetts.  Medicaid spending will fall, but only a 
modest amount ($0.1 billion). The efficiency issue turns mainly on the treatment of health benefits 
from reduced smoking induced by the settlement.  We conclude that the settlement was a move 
towards economic efficiency. 
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  The recent litigation undertaken by the Attorneys General of several states against the 
major tobacco companies culminated in November 1998 in the well-publicized settlement.
1 The 
settlement, the terms of which are made explicit in a “Master Settlement Agreement” (the MSA), 
involves the largest sum of money paid in any civil litigation in American history.
2  While the 
final amount of the settlement is contingent upon certain future events, especially tobacco sales, 
the tobacco manufacturers have agreed to pay 46 states about $87 billion (in present value) 
through 2025 to compensate for health care expenses incurred by the Medicaid program. 
  In this paper we ask whether the settlement was a move toward economic efficiency.  We 
conclude that it was.  We focus our analysis on Massachusetts, the state for which we have 
particular expertise and data, but we believe our key conclusions will generalize to other states.
3 
  The MSA has several components. First, the MSA specifies monetary payments from the 
tobacco companies to state governments.  We estimate the payments to Massachusetts to be $4 
billion in present value through 2025.
 4  These payments are being financed by higher cigarette 
prices.  Additional revenues to state governments are valuable for those entities, and the citizens 
they represent.  But for the economy as a whole they are simply transfers from one party (future 
smokers) to another party (all the citizens of the state).  Transfers do not by themselves affect 
economic efficiency.
5   
  The increase in cigarette prices to finance the payments, however, will reduce the demand 
                                                 
1  A copy of the settlement can be found at www.naag.org/tobac/index.html.  The MSA resolves payments to 
46 states.  Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi and Texas reached prior settlements with the tobacco manufacturers. 
2    See http://www.courttv.com/trials/tobacco/national/111698_ctv.html.  Although the claim to be the largest 
settlement is likely based on nominal undiscounted values through 2025, we believe the settlement is the largest sum 
paid in real terms as well. 
3   We were retained by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as experts on Medicaid costs incurred because of 
smoking (see Cutler et al., 1998a, b, c).  Massachusetts has 2.3 percent of the national population and its Medicaid 
spending is 3.3 percent of the national total.  Thus, one can extrapolate our values to the nation as a whole by 
multiplying the Massachusetts values by a factor of 30 to 40. 
4    Though the MSA in some cases predicts payments through the year 2548 (for 550 years!), we carry our 
calculations through the year 2025.  Not only are any forecasts beyond the first 10-25 years subject to considerable 
uncertainty, they will be unimportant at usual discount rates. 
5   One might contend that the increase in state revenues reduces deadweight loss by lowering revenue needs 
from other sources, for example the state income tax.  But the increase in nominal wages from lower income tax rates 
is exactly offset by the increase in prices from the implicit cigarette taxes.  There is no real wage change from this 
substitution.  The only net effect of changing the mix of taxes is the change in cigarette consumption relative to other 
consumption, which we address separately.  This tax mix point is similar to the ‘double dividend’ debate in   2 
for cigarettes.  In addition, the MSA prohibits or restricts certain forms of advertising, such as 
cartoon characters and tobacco company sponsorship of public events.  Further, the MSA funds 
tobacco counter-advertising that may convince people to quit or not begin smoking.  We believe the 
increase in prices and counter-advertising will work to reduce cigarette consumption.  We estimate 
that these provisions will ultimately reduce smoking by 11 to 13 percent of baseline amounts, with 
90 percent of this reduction from the price increase and the remaining 10 percent from the counter-
advertising campaign. 
  The reduction in cigarette consumption will affect economic efficiency in two ways.  First, 
reduced cigarette utilization will reduce the external costs associated with cigarettes.  Lower rates of 
smoking in the future will translate into lower Medicaid spending, the savings from which are a 
direct benefit to taxpayers.  Indeed, taxpayers benefit both from the reduced taxes needed to finance 
Medicaid and the reduced deadweight loss from lower overall tax rates.  We calculate the gains of 
reduced Medicaid spending to be relatively small, however -- about $0.1 billion to Massachusetts in 
present value from 1999 to 2025.  This savings is perhaps one-fourtieth of the direct payments to 
the state and about less than a tenth of a percent of the present value of future direct spending by the 
state.
6  Given the size of these numbers, we feel comfortable ignoring other effects on state 
programs, such as state employee health insurance. 
  The second, and far larger, effect of reduced cigarette consumption is that people will live 
longer, healthier lives.  An important reason these benefits are larger is that the price and counter-
advertising effects apply to all smokers and potential smokers, whereas the Medicaid program 
effects apply only to Medicaid beneficiaries.  We estimate the health benefits to Massachusetts of 
additional longevity alone (ignoring the benefits from reduced morbidity) at $29-$91 billion (in 
1999 dollars) by 2025, with a ‘best guess’ of perhaps $60 billion.   
  These health benefits are only a net gain to society if people did not account for them 
properly in their smoking decisions.  In the rational addiction model of smoking (Becker and 
Murphy, 1988), for example, smokers internalize the health costs of their smoking decision, and 
thus the internal benefits of reduced smoking are offset by the internal costs of lost cigarette 
pleasure.  If this were not true, people would not smoke in the first place.  We consider but reject 
                                                                                                                                                             
environmental economics (Goulder, 1995). 
6   It is about half a percent of current annual spending.   3 
this argument. The evidence for the rational addiction model is not persuasive in comparison to 
other plausible models, particularly those where individuals overly discount current benefits at the 
expense of future benefits, where peer group interactions influence smoking decisions, and where 
youths experience regret or have biased expectations regarding addiction.   
  Still, if one believed part of the rational addiction model and cut our estimates of the health 
gains by 60 percent, the magnitude of the health benefits remains overwhelmingly large – perhaps 
$24 billion through 2025.  This gain is large absolutely and relative to the payments that 
Massachusetts will collect.  We estimate that for every $1 transferred from tobacco companies to 
the state, there are $6 of efficiency gains.  
  The reduced consumption of cigarettes will disadvantage some workers in the tobacco 
industry, and may result in some movement of resources out of tobacco and into other industries.  
These changes may reduce welfare of workers in the tobacco industry and owners of tobacco farms, 
but they are not an efficiency loss except perhaps for transitory effects.  If the reduction in cigarette 
consumption is appropriate for external or internal cost reasons, the change in resource distribution 
that accompanies that demand reduction is an appropriate change socially.   
  This paper is structured in three parts.  The first section estimates the financial payments to 
states under the MSA, and to Massachusetts in particular.  The second and third sections estimate 
the efficiency consequences of the settlement, focusing on lower Medicaid expenses (the second 
section) and the value of longer life (the third section).  The last section summarizes and concludes. 
 
I.   Financial Payments to the States 
 
We set the stage for our later efficiency analysis of the MSA by first valuing the financial 
transfers that the MSA specifies.  Payments under the MSA are a product of a base amount and 
adjustments for a series of factors, including inflation and changes in the number of cigarettes 
sold.  In this section we project payments for the nation as a whole and for Massachusetts. 
There are six separate payments called for by the MSA, detailed in Table 1.  The first is 
an initial up-front payment.  Up-front payments for all 46 settling states total $12.7 billion (in 
nominal terms) between 1998 and 2003.  The second, the heart of the settlement, are annual 
payments for Medicaid damages. Across all 46 states these payments total $87 billion in present   4 
value between 2000 and 2025, and continue at the amount of $8.6 billion per year (in nominal 
terms) thereafter.  To put these amounts in perspective, in 2000 these two payment streams 
combined amount to $0.32 per pack of cigarettes sold, and are expected to be $0.37 per pack in 
2010. 
The third payment is strategic contribution payments of $8.6 billion, to reward states 
whose litigation efforts contributed to the settlement.  There are additional funds for education 
and public outreach.  The settlement creates a National Foundation to Reduce Teen Smoking and 
Substance Abuse ($250 million) and establishes a National Public Education Fund ($1.45 billion) 
to sponsor tobacco counter-advertising.  Finally, there are payments to the National Association 
of Attorneys’ General for enforcement of the settlement ($51.5 million).  We assume these funds 




Table 1.  Total Payments to the States under the MSA 
 
TYPE OF PAYMENT A MOUNT (NOMINAL DOLLARS) ADJUSTMENTS 
Initial up-front payments   $12.7 billion total from 1999-
2003 
Volume and non-settling states 
Base payments   $4.5 billion in 2000 up to $9 




$861 million per year, 2008-2017  All except previously settled 
states. 
National Foundation to 
Reduce Teen Smoking and 
Substance Abuse 
$25 million per year, 1999-2008  No adjustments. 
Public Education Fund  $1.45 billion over 1999-2003  Inflation and volume. 
National Association of 
Attorneys’ General for 
enforcement of the settlement 
$51.5 million over 1998-2007  No adjustments. 
 
 
As noted in the right hand column of the table, several adjustments are made to some of 
these payments.  These adjustments are detailed in Table 2.  The first adjustment is for inflation.  
The MSA allows for annual payment increases of 3 percent or the increase in the CPI, whichever 
is greater; we use the 3 percent figure in our estimates.  The most notable adjustment, shown in 
                                                 
7   These payments should in principle be deducted from efficiency gains, but because of their modest size in   5 
the second row, is for volume changes. Payments are reduced by 98 percent of the percentage 
decline in cigarette sales.  There are smaller adjustments for previously settled states, for non-
setting states, for non-participating manufacturers, for any future federal legislation that might 
pre-empt the MSA, and for violation of a litigation release agreement. 
In addition to the statutory adjustments, there was initially an issue about whether the 
states will keep all of the settlement proceeds, or whether the federal government will reclaim the 
federal Medicaid share.  This issue has now been resolved, so that all of the money remains with 
the states (absent that going to the National Association of Attorneys’ General). 
 
  Table 2.  Adjustments to Payment Streams 
 
ADJUSTMENT D ESCRIPTION K EY ASSUMPTIONS INCORPORATED 
INTO OUR CALCULATIONS 
Inflation adjustment    Annual payments increase by 3% or 
the increase in the CPI, whichever is 
larger 
Assumed inflation 3% or less per year 
Volume adjustment:    Payments reduced by 98% of the 
percentage decline in cigarette sales.   
Adjustment reduced by 25% of any 
profit increases. 
Annual volume of cigarette sales 
modeled as a function of secular trend 
and price elasticity of demand.   




Accounts for payments already made 
to MS, FL, TX, and MN. 
As directed by MSA, no additional 
assumptions necessary.  
Non-settling states 
adjustment 
Accounts for any states that did not 
sign the MSA. 




Addresses the possibility that 
participating manufacturers will lose 
market share to non-participating 
manufacturers.  States are given 
incentives to pass laws to tax non-
participating firms at same level as 
MSA. 
Incentives are for all states to tax non-
participants and therefore for all 
manufacturers to participate.  We 




Reduces obligations of participating 
manufacturers dollar for dollar for 
federal legislation passed by 
11/30/2002. 
Assume no new federal legislation 
before 11/30/2002; no adjustment. 
Litigating releasing 
parties Offset  
Reduces the obligations of the 
participating manufacturers dollar for 
dollar for settlements against which 
they should have been released under 
Assume that no such settlements are 
reached. 
                                                                                                                                                             
relationship to the benefits we have estimated, we ignore them.   6 
the MSA.   
 
Because the volume adjustment is important to the value of the settlement, and is the 




  Changes in the Volume of Cigarettes Consumed 
 
The MSA has three factors that might reduce the demand for cigarettes.  The first is price 
increase of 45 cents per pack that the participating manufacturers imposed to finance the costs of 
the settlement immediately following the settlement in November 1998.  Non-participating 
manufacturers are expected to implement comparable price increases after most states pass the 
“model legislation” set forth in the MSA, which effectively taxes those manufacturers who do 
not participate in the settlement.
8 
The ultimate price increase might be higher than the 45 cents previously enacted for two 
reasons.  First, if manufacturers’ price increases are marked up by wholesalers and retailers, the 
price increase faced by consumers would be greater.  In fact, however, past empirical studies of 
the impact of cigarette tax increases on the retail price of cigarettes have uniformly concluded 
that there is no appreciable additional markup (Barnett, et al., 1995; Merriman, 1994; and 
Sumner, 1981).  This is because wholesalers and retailers generally set their markup as an 
absolute dollar amount above their costs of business, rather than a percentage, consistent with the 
competitive nature of the retail industry.  Second, states may respond to the settlement by raising 
their excise taxes in an attempt to partially recoup lost excise tax revenue (as a result of sales 
reductions).  But essentially all of the settlement receipts are passed back to the states 
themselves, and thus will exceed the lost state excise tax revenues from the decline in cigarette 
volume.  Thus, it is even possible that states could lower excise taxes in response to this inflow.  
In our analysis we have assumed that the 45-cent price increase is the amount that will prevail.   
The extent to which demand will decline as a result of the price increase depends on the 
                                                 
8   As of April 1, 2000, more than half the states had passed such legislation; in the remaining states, the 
model legislation is pending.  All states have an incentive to pass such legislation quickly, so that a similar price 
increase should occur on all cigarettes in the near future.   7 
elasticity of demand for cigarettes.  A substantial literature has looked at this issue.  The most 
recent, and complete, review is by Chaloupka and Warner (2000).  They conclude that a 
consensus estimate of the demand elasticity for cigarettes is –0.4.
9   We use an elasticity of -0.4 
for our estimates. 
The price increase of 45 cents is a 20 percent increase (using an average of the baseline 
and final price).  Assuming a demand elasticity of –0.4, one would expect a demand reduction of 
about 8 percent.  The 1999 data indicate a reduction in cigarette sales of approximately 6.5 
percent, somewhat lower than our model would predict, but clearly other factors may have been 
at play [Economic Research Service, 2000].  If, however, 6.5 percent is the long-run value of the 
demand response, our estimates of payments to the state are low; i.e., we may have overadjusted 
for volume declines.  Our estimated health effects, however, used a lower elasticity value; see 
below.  Both these factors make our estimates of the efficiency gain conservative. 
  The second factor affecting cigarette demand is the restrictions on advertising.   The MSA 
embodies a number of restrictions on industry advertising.  In particular, the settlement: 
•  Prohibits targeting youth in advertising and promotion 
•  Bans cartoon characters in cigarette ads or packaging 
•  Restricts tobacco sponsorship of public events 
•  Bans outdoor and transit advertising of tobacco products 
•  Bans placement of tobacco products in movies and other entertainment 
•  Bans sale of apparel and merchandise with brand-name logos 
•  Bans youth access to free samples 
•  Bans gifts without proof of age 
 
In evaluating the impact of these advertising bans on cigarette consumption, several 
points are relevant.  First, these limitations are very small relative to total tobacco advertising and 
promotional expenditures.  According to the Federal Trade Commission [1998], outdoor and 
transit advertising was only 6.3 percent of tobacco industry advertising expenditures in 1996, and 
public entertainment (which is a restricted and not eliminated category) was only 3.4 percent. 
There may be some additional reductions in advertising, but the reductions altogether are 
unlikely to exceed 10 percent of total advertising spending. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
9   The -0.4 value is also consistent with the review of the literature by the Congressional Budget Office (1998) 
and Evans, Ringel and Stech (1998).   8 
Second, there is no restriction on the tobacco industry’s increasing advertising 
expenditures through other venues to compensate for these restrictions.  Tobacco advertising is 
very fluid; in just two years (from 1994-1996), for example, promotional allowances rose from 
34.7 percent to 42.1 percent of total spending.  Furthermore, outdoor and transit advertising has 
been in decline; in 1986, these categories were twice as large a share of total advertising dollars.  
The industry might well substitute for the advertising bans by increasing ads in other areas.   
Partly as a result of this, the existing literature does not provide a very strong consensus 
on the role of cigarette advertising in affecting smoking.  Chaloupka and Warner [2000] conclude 
that aggregate cigarette advertising has a small impact on total cigarette sales, and that previous 
advertising bans (such as the ban on television advertising did not appreciably affect cigarette 
smoking.  Even a much more favorable review of the advertising literature by Andrews and 
Franke [1991] estimated an elasticity of smoking with respect to advertising dollars of only 0.06. 
 Hence, a 10 percent reduction in advertising, which is the largest effect that could be envisioned 
from this settlement, would lower smoking by only 0.6 percent, a very small amount.  As a result 
of this evidence, we assume that there is no impact of advertising restrictions on smoking 
behavior. 
The third part of the MSA that will influence cigarette demand is the funding for smoking 
counter-advertising and education.  Anti-smoking programs will be funded in two ways: the 
National Foundation to Reduce Teen Smoking and Substance Abuse is funded for $250 million 
over the next ten years, to study programs to reduce youth smoking and substance abuse; and the 
National Public Education Fund is funded for $1.45 billion over the next five years to carry out 
sustained advertising and education programs to counter youth tobacco use and educate 
consumers about tobacco-related disease. 
Current spending on counter-advertising and education in the U.S. is approximately $150 
million per year.
10  The Public Education Fund alone would increase counter-advertising and 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
10    Based on data collected by CDC (private conversation with Jeff McKenna from Office on Smoking and 
Health, January 14, 1999).  This consists of roughly $85 million in counter-advertising and education spending by 
the states; roughly $12 million of spending by federal agencies (FDA, CDC, and NCI); and roughly $50 million in 
spending by the federal government on its ASSIST and IMPACT programs that are designed to provide 
infrastructure for state anti-smoking efforts. 
   9 
education spending by up to $300 million per year for five years, a 200 percent increase in 
spending. 
The literature suggests that counter-advertising deters smoking.  The Fairness Doctrine, 
which was in place from 1967 until 1971, mandated counter-advertising in proportion to direct 
cigarette advertising on television.  Smoking fell by an estimated 5 percent in those years 
(Warner, 1977).   Indeed, some have claimed that the net impact of the subsequent ban on 
television advertising of cigarettes was to raise consumption, because it also eliminated the 
counter-advertising (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000).  A study of California’s substantial counter-
advertising initiative that began in the late 1980s estimated an elasticity of smoking with respect 
to counter-advertising of -0.05 (Hu, et. al., 1994, 1995).  This study is hampered by the fact that 
it has time series evidence for only one state, California, in a period shortly after a substantial 
price increase.  Thus, it is difficult to separate long-run price effects from the effects of the 
counter-advertising.  Still, if we take the Hu, et. al. elasticity at face value, the 200 percent 
increase in spending induced by the MSA will lead to a 10 percent decline in smoking.   
We make a relatively conservative assumption – that the increase in counter-advertising 
and education will have roughly the same effect as the Fairness Doctrine, a 5 percent decline in 
smoking, phased in at 1 percent per year for the five years that the public education fund is 
spending. 
The decline in smoking from the price increase, the advertising restrictions, and the 
counter-advertising campaign comes on top of a substantial trend over time of lower cigarette 
consumption.  Over the past 20 years, cigarette usage has declined by about 1.2 percent per year. 
 Since 1994, however, cigarette smoking has remained roughly constant.
11  In the analyses here, 
we assume that the decline in smoking will resume, but at half the previous rate, or 0.6 percent 
per year.  
Figure 1 shows our estimate of the volume of cigarettes consumed nationally under the 
pre-MSA baseline and with the provisions of the MSA.
12  We estimate that the settlement will 
                                                 
11    Tobacco Institute [1998]. 
12    Baseline price and consumption data come from an analysis by Gary Black of Sanford Bernstein Company 
(December 15, 1998).  Cigarette prices in 1998 averaged $1.97 per pack, with 23.8 billion packs sold.  There is a 
federal tax increase scheduled of 10 cents in 2000 and 5 more cents in 2002 that is built into the baseline.  For our 
Massachusetts-specific analysis, we use price data specific to that state. In 1998, cigarettes prices averaged $2.79 per   10 
lower smoking by about 11 percent by 2003, relative to the non-settlement baseline.   In later 
years, the percentage decline relative to the baseline is slightly larger (13 percent in 2025), as 





 Estimated  Payments 
 
We combine the payment and adjustment assumptions to estimate total payments under 
the MSA to Massachusetts.  Massachusetts has 2.3 percent of the nation’s population and 3.3 
percent of its Medicaid spending.  As of now, Massachusetts’ share of Foundation spending and 
Public Education Fund spending is not clearly delineated.  We therefore make the most 
conservative assumption, assuming the state receives no payments from these two sources.   
Because these payments are small, our calculations are not substantially affected by how we treat 
them.  In forming present values throughout the paper, we use a nominal discount rate of 7 
percent per year, or 4 percent in real terms.  This was a consensus discount rate of investment 
bankers in their proposals to securitize the financial payment streams to the plaintiff’s attorneys.  
Thus, it incorporates factors such as the risk of default by the tobacco companies.   
Table 3 shows the present value of payments to states as a whole, and to Massachusetts in 
particular, beginning in 1999 and continuing through either 2010 or 2025.  We estimate that 
states as a whole will receive $58.8 billion in present value through 2010, and $104.7 billion 
through 2025.  Massachusetts will receive $2.3 billion through 2010 and $4.2 billion through the 
year 2025.
13  These amounts represent roughly 2 percent of state tax receipts.  
 
Table 3: Estimated Payments Under the MSA  
NPV in 1999 dollars – billions 
 
           T h r o u g h   P e r i o d  
Group                     2010       2025 
                                                                                                                                                             
pack in Massachusetts, well above the national average. 
13    For comparison, under the same assumptions but absent the volume adjustment, the payments to the 
Commonwealth would be $2.6 and 4.8 billion through 2010 and 2025, respectively.   11 
 
“Nation” (46 states)
14 $58.8  $104.7 
Massachusetts 2.3    4.2 
 
  
  These payments by themselves have no efficiency consequences.  They are merely 
transfers from one set of people (future cigarette smokers) to another (all future taxpayers).  If 
this were the entire effect of the settlement, economic efficiency would be unchanged.   
But the effects do not end here.  The increased price of cigarettes and other provisions of 
the settlement will result in substantial reductions in cigarette consumption.  This consumption 
decline will influence economic efficiency in two ways: by reducing the external costs of 
smoking; and by helping smokers to better internalize the costs of smoking.  We quantify these 
effects in the next two sections. 
 
II.   Reduced Medicaid Spending  
 
  The first effect of the MSA on efficiency is through reduced spending by Medicaid.  By 
reducing smoking prevalence, the MSA will reduce the cost of the smoking-related illnesses.
15  
This is entirely an efficiency gain.  In addition, there is the added effect of reducing deadweight 
loss from financing this spending.  We have estimated the savings to Medicaid from the MSA at 
some length in our earlier research (Cutler, et. al., 1998a, b, c, 1999).   In this section we 
summarize these findings. 
  We divide Medicaid spending into spending for adult inpatient care, adult outpatient care, 
long-term care, and care for low-birthweight infants.  We project these values to 2025 assuming 
that expenditures will grow at a nominal rate of 6 percent for each age and gender group.
16   
  To calculate the proportion of the Medicaid expenditures attributable to smoking, we 
multiply Medicaid spending by a Smoking Attributable Fraction (SAF) of expenses.  For adult 
                                                 
14  The 46 states comprising the settlement have 85 percent of the national population.  
15   Because we analyze annual spending, rather than lifetime spending we may overestimate long-run cost 
savings to Medicaid.  Savings based on lifetime spending may be less, because increased longevity is likely to entail 
additional health costs, but these will be heavily discounted at usual discount rates.    
16    This growth rate reflects the following assumptions: inflation of 3%, real growth in services per capita of 2% 
and population growth of 1%.   12 
inpatient and outpatient care, we estimate the SAF using regression models relating health care use 
at the individual level to indicators for whether the individual was a current, former, or never 
smoker, controlling for other individual covariates.  The smoking coefficients, when weighted by 
the share of current and former smokers in the population, indicate the share of medical spending 
attributable to smoking.  For long-term care and low-birthweight babies, we used published data on 
relative risks of particular diseases for smokers, in combination with data on smoking rates by these 
populations.  Overall we estimate that about 7 percent of adult Medicaid spending is attributable to 
smoking for the period 1992-1998, although in 1998 the percentage had fallen to 5 percent. 
The first two columns of Table 4 show estimates of Medicaid spending attributable to 
smoking.  We forecast that absent the MSA, the present value of Medicaid spending in 
Massachusetts on smoking-related diseases would be $3.4 billion through 2010, and $7.2 billion 
through 2025.  This is larger than, but of the same order of magnitude as, the financial payments to 
the state.  Indeed, in our earlier work (Cutler et al., 2000), we estimated that in the first years of the 
settlement, the financial payments under the MSA about equal the damages from smoking.  Over 
time, the settlement covers less of the costs of smoking because the increase in medical costs 
forecast in our baseline is greater than the increase in payments provided for under the MSA. 
  We then estimate how these amounts will change with the change in smoking prevalence.  
We note that such estimates may understate, perhaps substantially, the savings to Medicaid from 
the MSA.   The sample of former smokers in survey data includes a number of individuals who 
stopped smoking because they were being treated for active disease.  Not surprisingly, those former 
smokers have very high Medicaid expenses.  Those who quit because of the MSA, in contrast, will 
have disproportionately quit for non-health reasons and thus are not likely to spend as much.  In 
effect, because we attribute the spending habits of past quitters to future quitters, we underestimate 
the effects of quitting smoking on medical spending.  We are not able to produce better effects with 
existing data, however.   
  The second columns of Table 4 show the expected reductions in Medicaid spending 
because of the MSA.
17  We expect that as a result of the MSA, Massachusetts will save $29 to $65 
                                                 
17   These savings are calculated based on the change in the number of smokers, not the total number of 
cigarette packs sold.  We discuss the methodology for estimating changes in the number of smokers in the next 
section. 
   13 
million over this time period.  These savings amount to about 1 percent of the costs attributable to 
smoking, which in turn are 0.08 percent of total forecast Medicaid spending.   
In addition to these savings, there are reduced deadweight costs because governments do 
not need to raise as much money.  Standard estimates in the economics literature suggest that the 
marginal deadweight loss from the existing tax system is about 30 cents per dollar raised (Ballard, 
Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley, 1984).  The savings in deadweight loss are therefore $9 million to 
$20 million.  The net savings are therefore $38 million through 2010 and $85 million through 2025. 
The overall effect of the MSA on Medicaid costs are very small. 
 
 
  Table 4:   
  Forecasts of Medicaid Spending Attributable to Smoking and Savings Under the MSA  
Net Present Value in 1999 dollars -- millions 
 
                Baseline Spending Through            Savings from MSA Through 
 2010 2025 2010 2025 
Expenses  for:         
Adult Acute Care  $2,256   $4,550           $6        $29 
Long Term Care
18  1,143  2,581          22          32 
LBW Babies   27 61             1            3 
 
Total  $3,427  $7,192               $29         $65 




  There will be other effects on state budgets that we have not tried to estimate.  Spending for 
state employee health insurance and direct delivery systems of health care such as city hospitals will 
fall, and for defined benefit pension plans for state employees will rise.  Medicaid, however, is a 
large program in the state budget, and the modest effect on Medicaid gives us confidence that 
ignoring these other programs will not cause a large error.
19 
                                                 
18   To give some idea of the importance of increased life span for computing Medicaid cost savings we 
recomputed our results assuming that the long-term care population grows at a rate that is 10% above the baseline 
(1% per year), beginning in the first year of the MSA.  Under this scenario, the present value of total Medicaid 
savings fall to $22.7 million and $30.0 million in 2010 and 2025, respectively. 
19   Spending on the Medicaid program is on the order of 15 percent of direct state spending (excluding 
transfers to local government) and about 12 percent of spending accounting for transfers to local government.  




III.   The Value of Lives Saved and Health Improved by the Settlement 
 
Smoking is the leading preventable cause of death in the United States (McGinnis and 
Foege, 1993).  Reductions in smoking therefore translate into substantial gains in life expectancy. 
 In this section, we estimate the health impacts of the MSA.   
We value the health effects of the MSA as resulting from reduced numbers of smokers 
only – quitters and people who never begin.  Although there are health benefits from continuing 
smokers’ consuming fewer packs, data limitations make estimating these benefits more difficult. 
 Moreover, in some of our calculations, we rely on published disease-specific relative risks, 
which are available only as a function of whether a person smokes and not as a function of the 
number of cigarettes smoked.  Ignoring the reductions in amounts smoked among smokers, of 
course, makes our estimates of health benefits conservative.
20 
 
Changes in the Number of Smokers 
We estimate the impact of the MSA on the number of smokers using a methodology 
similar to that developed above.  We assume the same 45 cent increase in prices in 
Massachusetts as elsewhere in the nation.  Because baseline cigarette prices are higher in 
Massachusetts than elsewhere (see footnote 12), the percentage increase in prices is smaller, only 
15 percent.
21 
The smoking participation elasticity is generally smaller than the elasticity of total packs 
of cigarettes consumed, because some of the response to higher prices is among existing 
smokers’ consuming fewer packs.  We draw estimates of participation elasticities from the 
literature.  For adult smokers, we use a participation elasticity of –0.25, based on research by 
Evans, Ringel, and Stech (1998).
22  Essentially all of the response for adults will be increased 
quitting, as opposed to reduced initiation because few adults initiate smoking.  Among 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Statistical Abstract, 1999, page 328). 
20   Potentially offsetting this conservative bias is the fact that we do not account for possible selection of who 
quits smoking.  If individuals who quit (or never start) smoking are (or would have been) relatively light smokers, 
there is a bias in the other direction. 
21   This is calculated using the midpoint of the prior 2.79 price and the assumed price increase of 45 cents.   15 
individuals who have ever smoked daily, 77 percent began smoking daily before age 20, and 91 
percent first tried a cigarette by that age (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
[1994]).   
Traditional estimates of the elasticity of youth initiation rates are higher, around -0.7 
(Chaloupka and Warner, 2000).  But these studies generally do not control for omitted state 
characteristics that might be correlated with both taxes and smoking rates.  Evans and Huang 
(1998) control for these factors and estimate a youth participation elasticity of -0.5, which we use 
in our estimates.
23  Because of the uncertainty in the literature about this value, we experiment 
with elasticities of one-half of our baseline value (-0.25) and zero.   
We again assume that restrictions on tobacco company marketing will not affect smoking 
prevalence.  Counter-advertising, however, will affect smoking habits.  Prior to the MSA, 
Massachusetts already had a significant amount of tobacco counter-advertising: $13 million of 
the $150 million spent nationally.  Hence, if we assume that the $300 million in the Public 
Education Fund is allocated to each state in rough proportion to that state’s population, 
Massachusetts’ share ($6.6 million) is only a 51 percent increase over current levels, compared to 
the 200 percent nationwide increase.  Thus, instead of assuming a cumulative 5 percent impact 
on smoking rates from counter-advertising (1 percent per year for five years) as we did 
nationally, we assume a cumulative 1.28 percent impact in Massachusetts (0.255 percent per year 
for five years).  
Finally, we differentiate the secular time trend in smoking rates into quitting rates, 
cutbacks among existing smokers, and reduced initiations.  According to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, about 70 percent of the trend decline in smoking is a result of fewer 
numbers of smokers, while 30 percent is a result of fewer cigarettes per active smoker (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 1998.)  We therefore assume the baseline reduction in 
smoking rates among adults is 0.42 percent per year (70 percent of the 0.6 percent per year 
decline).  Forecasting the time trend in youth smoking is more difficult. Youth smoking declined 
                                                                                                                                                             
22   This compares to their total elasticity estimate of –0.41.   
23   Other recent work (DeCicca, et. al., [1998]) has claimed that the elasticity of participation is much smaller, 
but this work has been effectively refuted by the observations of Dee and Evans [1998].  In addition, recent work by 
Sherry Glied [1999] has indicated that price changes may only delay smoking participation in youth rather than 
prevent such behavior.  These findings suggest that the long-run elasticity may be considerably lower, perhaps zero.   16 
substantially in the late 1970s, was relatively flat in the 1980s, and rose precipitously in the 
1990s. In Massachusetts, the trend in youth smoking has been flat in recent years (Abt 
Associates, 1997).  In the absence of a good model of youth smoking initiation, we assume no 
secular trend in smoking initiation by youths. 
Using these assumptions, we estimate a decline in the number of adult smokers resulting 
from the MSA (increased number of quitters) of 45,000, or 5 percent.  For youths, assuming a 
price elasticity of –0.5, we estimate a decline in the number of smokers (increased number of 
never smokers) of 13,000, or 8 percent. Approximately 1,400 of these never smokers are replaced 
each year by a new cohort.
 24 With the lower elasticity estimate of –0.25 for youths, youth never-
smokers rise only 7,800 (5 percent), with a new cohort of approximately 990 each year.  With the 
elasticity of zero, the only changes in youth smoking occur in the first five years, due to the 
counter-advertising measures.  Under this zero elasticity assumption, youth smoking is reduced 
by 2,100 persons (1.8 percent) by 2004. 
As mentioned above, the actual decline in cigarette sales in 1999 was 6.5 percent.  
Although we do not know the distribution of this decline and therefore how health might have 
been affected, the elasticities we are using to estimate health benefits appear if anything to be 
low.  Thus, the health benefits we estimate may be somewhat low. 
 
Longevity Benefits from Reduced Smoking 
To compute the number of life-years saved by the MSA, we use estimates of difference in 
life expectancy for smokers compared to non-smokers taken from the simulation model 
developed for the Healthier People Network.
25  This projects life expectancy using a probabilistic 
model of disease and survival and assumed values of demographic characteristics (current age, 
sex, height, weight, smoking status). We ran simulations for men and women separately for 
                                                 
24  The number of “new” children who become smokers each year under current law is derived from CDC data 
that report that 3,000 children in the U.S. start smoking every day.  Multiplying by 365 and taking the Massachusetts 
share of youth (~2%), yields an annual estimate of new youth smokers in Massachusetts of 21,882.  
25    HPN Health Risk Appraisal V6.0,  The Healthier People Network, Decatur, Georgia, 1997.  The model also 
incorporates CDC life-table data: National Center for Health Statistics.  Vital Statistics of the United States, 1995, 
preprint of vol. II, mortality, part A sec 6 lifetables.  Hyattsville, MD.  1998.  This model has been independently 
validated.  See, for example, Foxman and Edington (1987) and Gazmarian, et al., (1991).   17 
youth “never starters” (assumed to be age 20) and adult quitters (assumed to be age 40).
26  
Characteristics of these representative individuals were set equal to the mean values for smokers 
of their age and sex from the National Health Interview Survey.   
Table 5 shows the change in longevity expected for people who quit or never start 
smoking.  Life expectancy increases by 5.1 to 6.5 years.  The increase is greater for men than for 
women and is greater for never starters than for quitters. 
 
Table 5: Life Expectancy in Years for Smokers, Quitters and Never Starters 
 
 Men  Women 
“Never Starter”    
Life expectancy at age 20 if never smoker  55.5  61.5 
Life expectancy at age 20 if smoker  49.0  55.8 




Life expectancy at age 40 if quitter  37.2  41.9 
Life expectancy at age 40 if remain smoker  31.2  36.8 
Difference in years  6.0  5.1 
 
Aggregate life-years saved per year by the MSA are the product of the reduced number of 
smokers and the increase in life-years expected for people who quit or never begin smoking.  The 
first row of Table 6 shows the number of life-years saved in Massachusetts.  We estimate about 
500,000 additional years of life lived by people alive by 2025. 
To monetize these health benefits, a value per life-year must be applied to the gains in life 
expectancy.
27   The estimates in the literature range from $70,000 to $175,000 in 1990 dollars, 
                                                 
26   Although this method is not exact because of the non-linear effect of smoking on mortality, our purpose is 
to demonstrate that the effect size is large relative to the monetary settlement. The approximation should be good 
enough for that purpose. 
 
27   The monetary value of a life-year is frequently estimated by studying individuals’ willingness to pay to 
reduce specific risks of mortality.  The valuation of risk reduction is then extrapolated to compute the value of a 
“statistical” life, from which the value of a single life-year is computed.  There are a number of alternative 
approaches to measuring the value of reductions in mortality caused by illness.  A method using quality-adjusted life-
years is one commonly used alternative.  This method accounts not only for the shortened life span of smokers but 
also for the pain and suffering caused by the fatal illness and its treatment.  A study by Jones-Lee, Hammerton, and 
Philips [1985] indicates that preventing death from cancer or heart disease (the primary intermediate causes of death 
from smoking) should be valued at two to three times instant death.  Our approach is both simpler and more 
conservative in that it ignores these quality of life factors.   18 
which is roughly $100,000 to $200,000 in 1999 dollars (Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian, 1994).
28  We 
consider a benchmark value of $150,000 per year, with alternatives of $100,000 per year and 
$200,000 per year. 
The bottom rows of Table 6 present our estimates of the cumulative net present value of 
gains in life expectancy induced by the MSA in Massachusetts.  Our benchmark estimate is a 
value of $56 billion through 2010 and $65 billion through 2025.  The lower and higher 
valuations of a year of life change this range accordingly.   
 
Table 6: Valuation of Increased Life Expectancy in Massachusetts 
       
  Through 2010 Through  2025 
  Life-years saved  424,000   552,000  
  
  Present discounted value of increased life expectancy ($ billion) assuming: 
      
     Medium value per life-year = $150,000  $56.2    $65.0   
     Low value per life-year = $100,000  37.5    43.3 
     High value per life-year = $200,000  74.9    86.7 
 
 
Because of the uncertainty surrounding the point estimate of the youth price elasticity, we 
examined the sensitivity of our estimates of the value of lives saved by the MSA assuming the 
elasticity was –0.25 and zero, respectively.  With a youth price elasticity of  –0.25, we found that 
the MSA saved 369,000 life-years through 2010.  Assuming no response to price by teen 
smokers, the MSA saved 267,000 life-years through 2010.  At the medium value of a life-year of 
$150,000, the net present value of these gains in life expectancy is $49 billion and $37 billion, 
respectively. 
 
                                                 
28   As above, we assume a 3% rate of inflation in the value of a life-year after 1999 and discount all measures 
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Morbidity Benefits from Reduced Smoking 
Although morbidity is a much more common outcome of smoking than is mortality, it is 
more challenging to value the reduced level of illness.  The problem of identifying incident (new) 
cases of disease is significant, and the willingness-to-pay of individuals to avoid sickness is less 
well understood than willingness-to-pay to avoid mortality.  
An illustrative calculation using a single disease category, chronic bronchitis, indicates 
the potential magnitude of the value of morbidity reductions induced by the MSA.  Because 
smokers are nearly ten times more likely to contract chronic bronchitis than non-smokers, about 
90-95 percent of chronic bronchitis is a result of smoking.  Using data on current prevalence rates 
and our estimates of changes in smoking, we calculate that 696 cases of chronic bronchitis in 
Massachusetts will be prevented by the MSA (8 percent of the baseline number). 
How much will people value the reduction in bronchitis?  The literature provides two 
pieces of evidence.  First, people are willing to pay about $100 to avoid a single day of coughing 
spells (Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian, [1994]).  So even if each case of bronchitis involved only 50 
day of coughing per year, the value for a single year for Massachusetts would be $3.5 million.  
Second, it has been estimated that to avoid chronic bronchitis altogether, people are willing to 
pay between $600,000 and $800,000 in 1999 dollars (Viscusi, Magat, and Huber, 1991).  The 
cumulative value of the benefits of the MSA, by this metric, are about $500 million.  
Clearly, if we extend such calculations to the morbidity induced by other smoking-related 
diseases, the measured financial benefits of the settlement could substantially increase. 
 
Should Benefits to the Smoker be Netted Out? 
  In conventional welfare economics any benefits of smoking to the smoker would be 
netted out from the value of the health benefits we have estimated here.  Indeed, the presumption 
would be that such benefits exceed even these very large health benefits or the individual would 
not have smoked.  Thus, for example, the well known rational addiction model argues that far 
from being a welfare gain, the price increase induced by the settlement would cause a net loss of 
welfare (Becker and Murphy [1988]; Becker, Grossman, and Murphy [1991, 1994]).
29  
                                                 
29   This statement does not consider any deadweight losses from taxes or premiums to finance medical care or   20 
  We have not adopted this position for several reasons.  First, most of the evidence in the 
literature supporting forward-looking behavior by consumers is also consistent with the theory 
that firms rather than consumers are forward looking.  The evidence supporting rational addiction 
comes from studies demonstrating that when price increases in the future are learned about today, 
consumption declines today, as smokers anticipate the declining value of consumption in the 
future.  As Showalter (1999) has pointed out, in the case of an addictive good, the response may 
be on the part of firms.  Firms that can price discriminate should subsidize initial consumption 
and charge a markup on later consumption.  Forward-looking behavior by firms is consistent 
with the industry’s targeting of promotional materials to adolescents and children (Arnett and 
Terhanian, [1998], DiFranza, et al., [1991], Fischer, et al. [1991]). 
Moreover, as already noted, most smokers begin to smoke and presumably become 
physiologically addicted in adolescence.  Given the de jure prohibition against sales to those 
under 18, it is not clear that consumer sovereignty with respect to smoking decisions should carry 
the usual weight.   
Moreover, adolescents seem overly optimistic about their ability to quit subsequently.  In 
a 1991 survey of high school seniors who smoked, 56 percent said they would not be smoking in 
five years, but in fact only 31 percent had quit by 5 years later (US Department of Health and 
Human Services, 1994).  Excessively optimistic forecasts of one’s ability to quit further undercut 
the case for respecting consumer sovereignty with respect to adolescent decisions to smoke.
30   
Even more importantly, the rational addiction model assumes time-consistent discount 
rates, but the implied discount rates in the prominent estimates of the rational addiction model 
are exorbitantly high, suggesting that the discount rate current smokers apply to the future costs 
of smoking may be around 90 percent per year.  One would expect a discount rate the same as for 
other consumption, presumably in the single digit percentages (Laux [2000]).  With such a high 
discount rate for the costs of smoking, Laux estimates that smokers may underestimate the future 
costs that they themselves bear, primarily reductions in health, by approximately 40 percent. 
                                                                                                                                                             
other collectively financed goods. 
30   Orphanides and Zervos (1995) suggest a rational addiction model in which adolescents sample cigarettes 
but are uncertain whether they will become addicted.  Some then do become addicted.  Orphanides and Zervos, 
however, assume that adolescents are unbiased in their forecasts of their ability to quit, an assumption the data do not 
seem to support.   21 
  Gruber and Köszegi (2000) have recently put forward a similar argument; they point out 
that there is a strong case for hyperbolic discounting in smoking – discount rates that value today 
too much over tomorrow, but annual discount rates after today at the expected rate (Laibson, 
1997).  There is substantial psychological evidence that individuals apply a higher discount rate 
to decisions involving shorter time horizons (Laux, 2000).  If hyperbolic rather than conventional 
discount rates are used, a large portion of the costs borne by the smoker would be relevant to 
welfare calculations.   
  Finally, Laux (2000) notes that smoking may involve peer group effects.  Smoking 
participation rates, for example, are higher among white adolescents than African-American 
adolescents, and rates are differential by sex in several countries.  Peer group effects may imply 
an externality, such that there may be a welfare gain from additional taxes or regulations.
31 
  None of the foregoing arguments, of course, implies that no benefits accrue to the smoker 
nor that any such benefits should not be netted out from the health gains that we estimate.  
Nonetheless, if Laux’s estimate that smokers may misestimate internal costs by 40 percent or so 
is approximately correct, the welfare gain from the MSA just to Massachusetts will be very large 
indeed – perhaps $24 billion. 
 
IV.   Summary and Conclusions 
 
  We have identified two aspects of the MSA that we believe will increase economic 
efficiency and have tried to estimate their magnitude.  These effects, and their magnitudes, are 
shown in Table 7.  First, there are modest benefits from reduced Medicaid spending brought 
about by lower smoking, and the lower deadweight loss from lower required tax collections.  
These benefits total about $100 million in present value through 2025. That they are so small 
relative to the other items suggests to us that ignoring effects on other state programs is a 
reasonable approximation.   
  The second, and far larger source of gain is the health benefits of reduced smoking.  We 
conservatively estimate the value to Massachusetts of the reductions in mortality induced by the 
                                                 
31   With peer group effects, individual demand curves shift with overall market demand.  The welfare gain 
assumes the individual demand curve post-tax or post-regulation is the relevant demand curve.  If individuals do not   22 
Settlement to be in excess of $28 billion in net present value (1999 dollars) by 2025. A higher end – 
but not upper bound – estimate is $91 billion.  How much of this gain should be counted as a gain 
in efficiency is uncertain, but we have argued that 40 percent of it might be relevant.  Even if the 







  Table 7:  Summary Impacts of MSA Effects on Economic Efficiency in Massachusetts 
NPV  -- $1999 Million 
 
 Estimates  Through 
 2010 2025 
 
Reduced Medicaid spending  $0.0  $0.1 
40 percent of reduced mortality*  $9.8 - $30.0  $9.8 - $34.7 
Total  $12.1 - $32.3  $14.1 - $39.0 
 
* The ranges reflects the lowest and highest values for the youth price elasticity of demand (0.0, -0.5) and 
the value of a life-year ($100,000, $200,000.) 
 
 
  In short, we estimate a gain in efficiency of $14 to $39 billion for Massachusetts through 
2025, with a best estimate of around $24 billion, using our middle estimate of the value of a life- 
year.  Gains for the nation may be some 30 to 40 times this amount. 
  To put this in perspective, we estimate that the settlement will transfer $4 billion from 
cigarette companies to Massachusetts.  Thus, for every dollar of transfer, we estimate efficiency 
gains of $6. 
  Against this must be laid the transactions costs of achieving the settlement.  The settlement 
calls for payments to all plaintiffs’ attorneys nationally of $500 million per year for 25 years, the 
present value of which is $5.8 billion.  We do not know the costs of the defense attorneys, although 
                                                                                                                                                             
choose their peer group, this change would be an external effect.  See Laux (2000).   23 
it was surely much less than $5 billion (given that it should not continue into the future).  If we take 
as a rough figure the Massachusetts share of this as 3 percent or $150 million, the costs are clearly 
modest compared to the gains. 
  The key issue in assessing whether the MSA was a move toward economic efficiency is 
whether the pleasures of smoking outweigh these benefits in the eyes of the smoker.  Iin other 
words, the key issue is whether consumer sovereignty should simply be honored so that the 
health benefits, which largely affect the smoker, are irrelevant because they are assumed to be 
outweighed by the unmeasured benefits of smoking.  We have presented a number of reasons 
why the conventional welfare economics argument does not apply to cigarette smoking and 
therefore why the MSA was a move toward economic efficiency.   
  To be sure, the transactions costs of the litigation were on their face much higher than 
simply legislating a tax increase, which would have had much the same effect.   Any legislative 
action, however, also carries transactions costs in the form of lobbying expenses, though 
presumably not on the same scale as the costs of litigation.  Moreover, increased federal taxes on 
cigarettes were not likely in the near term, and increased state taxes bring with them the problem of 
bootlegging or smuggling from other states. 
  Our estimates of health benefits are not complete.  For example, we did not consider the 
health consequences of second-hand smoke, nor did we include comprehensive estimates of 
morbidity. In addition, we did not take up more global effects on the policy environment.  For 
example, the success of the Attorneys General against the tobacco companies is likely to have been 
a motivating factor in the recent lawsuits brought against the gun manufacturers, which in turn may 
force improvements in gun safety.  Quantifying the full range of effects of the MSA and similar 
litigation, such as the suit against the gun manufacturers, is an important area for future research.  
We believe, however, that such research will only serve to reinforce our main finding: that the 
MSA represents a substantial increase in economic efficiency, of which the financial flows are but a 
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